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The Western European Union (WEU) was established in October 1954 and was built 
on the ruins of the European Defence Community. The latter had been an attempt to 
create a European army, bringing together troops from different European countries, 
including West Germany.
1 When the French parliament refused to ratify the EDC 
treaty in the summer of 1954 a new plan was devised to allow German rearmament 
and prepare the way for German membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. It was 
decided to accept West Germany and Italy into the Brussels Treaty, which had been 
created  six  years  earlier  as  a  collective  self-defence  organization.  West  Germany 
promised  not  to  manufacture  any  atomic,  biological  or  chemical  weapons  and 
renounced  the  production  of  missiles,  warships  and  bomber  aircraft  for  strategic 
purposes.  The  creation  of  the  WEU  was  a  dashing  exploit,  and  historians  have 
invariably pointed to the leadership of the British prime minister Sir Anthony Eden to 
bring  about  the  deal.
2 From  the  beginning,  however,  there  were  serious  doubts 
whether any succes would be granted to the organization because the North Atlantic 
alliance occupied a leading position already.  
Until 1973 when Great Britain was not yet a full member of the European 
Economic Community, the WEU acted as a  liaison between the British and the Six. 
Only the first twenty years of the organization will be examined in this article because 
the European countries undertook tentative efforts from the early 1970s to develop 
political co-operation and WEU was in principle no longer the sole option to discuss 
European  security  interests.  In  later  periods,  in  particular  during  the  1980s,  the 
Western  European  Union  offered  a  platform  to  discuss  further  co-ordination  of 
defence  policies  among  the  member  states.  As  a  rule,  these  two  elements  are  
highlighted  in  the  historical  analyses  of  the  organization.
3 However,  the  body  of 
scholarly  literature  on  the  WEU  is  slight,  and  the  organization  does  not  figure 
prominently in accounts of European defence during the Cold War either as it was 
never able to to develop into a full European defence organization.
4 
This article discusses the role of the parliamentary assembly of the WEU, and 
deals, first of all, with the power and procedures of this body. Then the reports on   2   
defence come up for discussion with a clear focus on nuclear control issues. Special 
attention is paid to the successive proposals for a NATO nuclear force. Finally, the 
article  analyses  the  outcome  of  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  the 
discussions at the national level between parliaments and governments of the member 
states. By drawing attention to the debates  in the WEU Asembly this article attempts 
to fill a gap in the scholarly literature. A focus on the discussions and actions of the 
Assembly offers a different perspective on the feasibility of nuclear options which 
were brought up for discussion at the governmental level and a better understanding 
of the effect of international cooperation among parliamentarians. Interparliamentary 
assemblies offered members of the national parliaments a forum to meet and discuss 
issues issues of interest to them.
5 Usually not much authority is assigned to these 




Power and procedures of the WEU Assembly 
The new WEU treaty created a ministerial Council as the main decision-making body 
of the new organization, and defined the Assembly as an interparliamentary organ 
with a consultative status. An Agency for the Control of Armaments was installed to 
supervise West German rearmament, ensuring it was in compliance with the voluntary 
arms limitations. A Standing Armaments Committee would be formed to deal with 
problems raised by the common adoption of equipment by the member states. It was 
also charged with the study of manufacturing items for common production.  
The WEU Assembly comprised 89 members, chosen from the representatives 
of the member countries to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Both 
assemblies also met at the same venue, the House of Europe in Strasbourg. During the 
first years the Assembly was preoccupied with discussions about its precise role. The 
London and Paris agreements of October 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, 
were  drafted  hastily,  and  had  left  many  issues  ambitious.  The  parliamentarians 
quickly accepted a charter and rules of procedure and stated that their mandate was ‘to 
proceed on any matter relevant to the Treaty … or upon any matter submitted to the 
Assembly for an opinion by the Council’.
6 In April 1956 the Assembly discussed their 
own  working  methods.  Marinus  van  der  Goes  van  Naters,  rapporteur  for  the 
organizational committee, put forward a strong argument on this occasion in favour of   3   
a  political  role  for  the  Assembly.  He  argued  that  even  if  the  parliament  had  no 
legislative powers, it possessed ‘an indisputable parliamentary competence and a right 
of  sanction.  …  We  do  possess  the  power  of  “supervision”  –  in  the  French  text 
contrôle – in other words, the right to be informed – as fully as is compatible with 
European public interest’.
7 It is obvious that the Assembly was feeling out its precise 
role, a situation rightly characterized by Paul Borcier, the press attaché of the WEU 
Assembly, as a ‘search for a vocation’.
8 As the Council did not address the issues 
raised by the parliamentarians a general feeling of frustration was prevalent during the 
next parliamentary session in October 1956. The Dutch Labour representative Franz 
Goedhart made the comment that the meeting looked ‘like a wailing wall without an 
echo’.
9 The sense of frustration was heightened because the Council was represented 
by the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Johan W. Beyen. It was generally known at 
the time that the minister would resign a few days later, and that he had no authority 
at all to make any promises to the parliament. 
The Council argued their case in greater detail for the first time in their annual 
report, presented in February 1957.
10 According to article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty,  the  Council  was  obliged  to  make  an  annual  report  on  its  activities  to  the 
Assembly. The Council stated that by its previous decision of December 1950 it had 
transferred its activities in defence matters to the North Atlantic Council. As NATO 
had taken responsibility for the preparation of a common defence policy, the only 
residual tasks for WEU were those specified in the treaty. Apart from the Standing 
Arms Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which accrued to the 
organization  on  account  of  the  treaty,  the  WEU  Council  had  decided  to  limit  its 
activities to the level of the defence forces of member states, the maintenance of a 
permanent British force in Europe, as well as matters which partners wished to raise 
under article VIII. This article provides for consultation in the event of any situation 
which may constitute a threat to peace. Standardization and control of armaments 
would  be  the  core  functions  of  the  WEU  in  the  view  of  the  Council.  The 
parliamentarians did not succeed to change the mind of the ministers. The Council 
maintained its view that NATO, not WEU, was responsible for European military 
matters; a point of view that has been called a limited, or ‘minimalist’ interpretation of 
the treaty. Others saw the WEU as the general agent of military integration in Europe, 
irrespective  of  the  role  of  NATO.
11 Just  because  of  the  ambiguities,  the  road  to 
integrative aims and processes might be open, the political scientist Ernst B. Haas   4   
argued in 1960.
12 His analysis of decision-making within the Council as well as the 
voting behaviour of the parliamentarians and qualitative analysis of the resolutions, 
however,  showed  no  such  tendency.  The  Council  acted  as  any  other 
intergovernmental body by making compromises, and the consensus on substantive 
defence  issues  within  parliament  merely  reflected  a  broad  political  consensus  in 
Western Europe on defence. From the beginning there was also a general consensus 
on procedure as the Assembly wanted to be heard by the Council and would continue 
to fight for its right to information. The Assembly would repeatedly call upon the 
Council to review its interpretation of the Treaty and improve the consultation process. 
Through the years there were some minor improvements, such as informal meetings 
between the parliamentary committees and the Council, but relations between the two 
bodies  remained  tense.  The  informal  meetings  were  less  informative  than  the 
parliamentarians  had  hoped  for  and  resulted  in  repeated  clashes  with  no  great 
improvement in procedures. The all-time low came with the rejection of the 1967 
annual report of the Council as not being sufficiently informative.  
  When the Western European Union came into being the formation of political 
parties at the international level in Europe had already yielded three such groups, the 
Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals. These transnational political groups  had 
been  formed  in  1953  in  the  Common  Assembly,  the  parliamentary  body  of  the 
European Coal and Steel Community.
13 In the WEU Assembly political groups were 
organized along the same lines and similar rules of procedures applied. The parties 
held  frequent  caucus  meetings  when  the  Assembly  was  in  session,  but  between 
meetings their contacts were limited. The parties were involved in the organization of 
the  Assembly  such  as  planning  of  the  debates  and  the  choice  of  president  and 
committee chairmen. According to the political scientist Peter Merkl in the early days 
there was a tendency to nominate British representatives as president in order to tie 
the British more firmly to Europe. For the chairmanship of the main committees a 
deliberate  partisan  formula  was  maintained  among  the  three  political  groups.
14 In 
practice the parties were largely in control of the Assembly procedures. In their voting 
behaviour  the  political  groups  showed  less  cohesion  during  the  first  six  years. 
National delegations were more cohesive  when voting on defence issues, but not with 
issues of organization. Merkl points to the very nature of defence issues, which affect 
the vital interests of the national states, to explain his findings . Party affiliation and   5   
national  adherence  will  be  taken  into  account    in  the  analyses  of  the  debates  on 
nuclear issues. 
  The  debates  on  defence  policy  in  the  WEU  Assembly  were  initially  by 
procedural questions. The Assembly created a committee on defence questions and 
armaments to deal with matters of defence. When the WEU Council submitted its 
annual report to the Assembly this Defence Committee was entrusted to study it and 
provide comments. Rapporteur Colonel Johannes J. Fens,  a member of the Dutch 
parliament as a representative of the Roman Catholic party, repeatedly stated that he 
was not satisfied with the Council’s replies to the questions put by the committee. In 
his view the Council was overcautious because they wanted to limit WEU activities. 
The committee concluded that the Council kept to a very strict interpretation of the 
responsibilities of the Assembly. They criticized this point of view in unmistakable 
terms and argued that they were entitled to answers to questions on any aspect of the 
defence of the West, either from the Council or directly from NATO, otherwise it 
would be impossible for them to have an informed debate. The committee specified 
the rearmament of West Germany as a point on which it wanted to be informed and 
called upon the Council to reconsider their point of view.
15 During the plenary debates 
too, several parliamentarians argued that they were able to take a wider view than 
national parliaments and could ‘turn a truly European eye on the problem of joint 
defence’.
16 
The working methods of the committee itself improved over time. As of 1956 
they started to visit factories, make tours of inspection of the armed forces of member 
countries and observe manoeuvres and joint exercises by NATO forces. As of 1959 
so-called joint meetings took place, in which the members of the Defence Committee, 
government representatives and NATO military advisors were brought together for 
informal discussions. Other requests for information were denied, as was a demand to 
establish contact between the Defence Committee and the permanent representatives 
of  NATO.  The  committee,  however,  had  regular  consultations  with  NATO 
commanders and invited defence specialists to be briefed on particular topics. The 
official ruling was that the members of the WEU Assembly did not have access to 
classified NATO information.
17 Whether this lack of information seriously hampered 
the  work  of  the  Committee  is  difficult  to  ascertain.  The  members  had  often 
participated in national defence committees or had previous experience of military 
staff work, being from military backgrounds themselves. The reports of the Defence   6   
Committee give an overview of the meetings, visits, briefings and discussions that the 
committee  organized  in  preparing  such  documents.  From  these  documents,  in 
particular the later ones, it is obvious that the Committee had ready access to high-
ranking officials across the continent as well as in the United States, both military as 
well as civilian.
18 In practice, the value of the contacts with NATO authorities, in spite 
of the restrictive ruling, depended to a large extent on the personalities involved, as 
Franz Goedhart concluded after investigating the procedure in 1970.
19 In an article 
published in 1984, Richard Grant, information officer for the North Atlantic Council, 
made an effort to analyse the influence of the parliamentary councils of the WEU and 
NATO. According to Grant, the members of the WEU committees themselves judged 
the meetings to be of little value: ‘The frequency of the meetings is an inconvenience 
to individual members and attendance is low’.
20 This last point may hold true for the 
later  period  but  was  definitely  not  so  during  the  first  twenty  years  of  the 
organization’s existence.   
 
The state of European security 
Up to 1975 inclusive, the WEU Assembly agreed on 283 recommendations, of which, 
at a rough estimate, slightly over 100 dealt with defence issues. Most observers at the 
time, as well as later historians, agree that the Defence Committee produced a series 
of remarkable reports.
21 Every year the Defence Committee conducted a review of the 
state  of  European  security  and  the  Assembly  subsequently  formulated  political 
recommendations addressed either to the WEU Council of Ministers or to the member 
countries. Over the years the Defence Committee also submitted numerous reports on 
other questions. In most cases these reports contained draft recommendations which 
often expressed the concerns of the parliamentarians over a topical issue. Many are 
also comprised of further details ensuing from the actual situation. Periodically, the 
committee published reports on problems with equipment, logistics or command. The 
Defence  Committee  also  formulated  reports  on  specific  questions  merely  for 
information. Some of these reports are extensive documents, such as that on guided 
missiles,
22 while the status of forces in Europe had been analysed in six successive 
reports by 1958.
23  
While the WEU Assembly took up a range of topics with regard to Atlantic 
defence, it developed a strong stand on some matters it deemed of major importance 
for  the  defence  of  Western  Europe.  Genuine  standardization  and  common   7   
procurement,  as  well  as  the  need  to  allocate  adequate  resources  to  defence,  are 
frequently mentioned as priorities. Nuclear weapons also figure prominently in the 
reports of the Defence Committee. The issue is brought up for discussion from two 
different  perspectives.  Firstly,  following  the  demand  to  maintain  adequate 
conventional forces for the defence of the continent, the WEU Assembly discussed 
military  strategy  and  the  respective  roles  of  nuclear  and  conventional  weapons. 
Secondly, they discussed the Europeanization of nuclear weapons, the subject of a 
series of the most striking reports from the period 1959–1964.  
The very first recommendation adopted by the Assembly on the urging of the 
Defence  Committee  in  October  1956  dealt  with  the  problem  of  maintaining 
conventional forces. This stance would be reaffirmed the following year when the 
recommendations agreed on, called for the maintenance of thirty divisions in view of 
the  danger  of  limited  aggression.  Only  a  joint  effort  would  enable  the  European 
countries to build up the forces to prevent both generalized and limited aggression. In 
the reports that were at the root of these recommendations, Colonel Fens discussed the 
role of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in Western defence. He pointed to the 
weakness  of  the  European  defence  system  and  the  loss  of  the  West’s  nuclear 
supremacy over the Soviet Union. Fens also rejected the concept that the West would 
use nuclear weapons ‘in all circumstances and in reply to any kind of aggression’,
24 
arguing  that  the  American  nuclear  deterrent  lacked  credibility  and  that  what  was 
needed was a wider range of options than surrender or total annihilation. To retaliate – 
and thus prevent – a limited Soviet attack, he suggested that sufficient and efficient 
shield forces were necessary so that the strategic use of nuclear weapons would not be 
required.  He  considered  that  limited  aggression  seemed  more  likely.  Here  Fens 
questions the strategy of massive retaliation formulated by US Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles. Simultaneously and in line with this argument the Assembly welcomed 
statements that the US government was considering the deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe.  
In subsequent years the recommendations of the Assembly would follow the 
same line and call for a minimum of thirty divisions or argue that conventional forces 
in  Europe  should  be  capable  of  discouraging  limited  offensive  action.  These 
recommendations  anticipate  the  concept  of  flexible  response,  which  was  under 
discussion at the time but not adopted as official NATO strategy until 1967. The 
reports of the Defence Committee also criticized the failure to integrate the armed   8   
forces into the Central European theatre and addressed other major obstacles for the 
organization  and  deployment  of  conventional  forces.  In  addition  to  more  general 
matters the recommendations sometimes comprised very detailed points. In 1959, for 
example,  the  Assembly  called  upon  the  Council  to  rationalize  naval  defence  and 
formulated  six  proposals  to  that  end.
25  Another  recommendation  requested  the 
Council to ensure that all equipment for tactical air forces in Europe was standardized 
and  common  supply  depots  established,  enabling  every  type  of  aircraft  to  be 
serviced.
26  
The remedies suggested by the Assembly met  with little or no enthusiasm 
from  the  governments  of  the  member  countries.  There  are  some  general 
considerations to explain the hesitance from the governments. National defence is one 
of the main responsibilities of national administrations and thus national decision-
making  structures  prevail.  Defence  policy  always  includes  sensitive  issues  too, 
politically,  economically  or  of  any  other  kind.  According  to  Richard  Grant, 
governments  were  generally  hostile  to  interparliamentary  involvement  in  security 
policies during the Cold War period as they considered defence matters too sensitive 
or too complex to be publically debated.
27 .Another very general explanation is to be 
found  in  terms  of  the  financial  consequences  of  the  measures  suggested  by  the 
Assembly. At the end of the 1950s, every Western European country rationalized its 
defence budget, when the huge increases in defence spending that had followed the 
outbreak of the Korean War came to an end. Nuclear weapons thus offered a way out 
for  most  European  governments  and  they  welcomed  the  deployment  of  American 
nuclear weapons on the continent.  
The German political scientist Gabriele Dransfeld provides yet another reason 
for  why  the  recommendations  had  no  effect.  She  argues  that  Western  European 
governments took the similarities in interests between NATO and WEU members for 
granted:  ‘The  Assembly  on  the  other  hand  starts  from  the  premise  of  a  Western 
European interest, which is different from NATO, as an alliance created and inspired 
by the US, on a number of economic, political and geographical factors’.
28 It was not 
always clear from the beginning what these European interests entailed, but Dransfeld 
is right in pointing out the main concern of the parliamentarians. They looked into 
various aspects of Western defence in view of the political implications for Western 
Europe and this holds true in particular when it came to nuclear weapons. 
   9   
Nuclear control issues 
Within  the  framework  of  the  annual  reports  on  defence,  the  Assembly  frequently 
touched upon the question of nuclear control. The report of September 1957 made a 
plea for some sort of joint decision-making and a basis of equality between the United 
States and Europe. The rapporteur Colonel Fens suggested that the WEU Council 
should decide in advance about the circumstances in which the member states would 
agree to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. On the basis of this agreement it was 
established that both the US president and the British prime minister should take final 
decisions on the use of these weapons. At the plenary session of the Assembly, the 
British Labour representative Kenneth G. Younger agreed that some attempt to reach 
general principles was the minimum which ought to be accepted, while the French 
parliamentarian Etienne de la Vallé Poussin demanded by way of question whether it 
would be sufficient for Europe that only Great Britain possessed nuclear weapons, or 
whether Europe needed its own. The recommendation urged the Council ‘to establish 
directives  concerning  the  utilization  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons’
29,  and  this  was 
adopted by the Assembly by 45 votes to 2 The opponents were two members of the 
SPD, the only two members of the German social democrats present.
30 
In two successive reports presented by Fens in 1958, he repeated his proposal 
for a joint-control mechanism over the most important weapons safeguarding Western 
security. He argued that the security interests of Western European countries could 
only be guaranteed if they participated in the decision to launch these weapons. In 
addition,  the  United  States  was  criticized  because  it  was  unwilling  to  relinquish 
centralized control. Thus, the right of consultation was the main goal pressed for by 
the Assembly.  
In 1959 Fens was succeeded as rapporteur for the Defence Committee by the 
British Labour representative Fred W. Mulley. In his report of October 1959, Mulley 
clearly  outlined  the  general  premises  of  Western  defence  and  pointed  to  the 
weakening of the American nuclear guarantee in view of the fact of nuclear parity 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
31 This would leave the non-nuclear 
countries in Europe only two options, the creation of a national nuclear deterrent or 
the  adoption  of  neutrality.  He  then  examined  in  greater  detail  the  solutions  put 
forward to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In the absence of other solutions, he 
developed  the  idea  of  creating  a  small  European  strategic  nuclear  force  as  a 
complement to the US strategic force. It was considered that this force should be   10   
under joint control of the WEU until the European and American forces were brought 
into a NATO pool. A Western European force would eliminate the danger of further 
national  nuclear  forces  even  if  it  did  not  diminish  the  danger  of  non-European 
countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This proposal could be interpreted as a bold 
statement, but the explanatory memorandum and the speech by Mulley at the plenary 
session of the Assembly suggest that this was not intended.
32 In fact, the second, more 
extensive part of the report was devoted to an analysis of the air forces, while the 
recommendation also emphasized the necessity of improving conventional weapons. 
The idea of a joint strategic nuclear force was put forward as a matter of principle, not 
as a programme of action. This was no definite plan, merely an idea for the future. 
Nevertheless, the proposal caused quite a stir in the Assembly and no less than 20 
members  of  parliament  took  the  floor  during  the  plenary  session.  The 
recommendation  was  only  adopted  with  42  votes  in  favour,  9  against  and  16 
abstentions. The opposition came from the German SPD and the French Gaullist party, 
while  most  abstentions  originated  from  Britisch  Conservatives.  Four  out  of  six 
representatives of Labour voted in favour of the resolution; two withheld their votes.
33 
The  ministers’  reply  was  a  sharp  refusal  because  NATO  was  responsible  for  the 
defence of both American and European territory, and the creation of a European 
strategic  force  would  only  increase  the  difficulties  of  control  as  well  as  involve 
wasteful duplication.  
 
A NATO nuclear force 
Soon the WEU Assembly and its Defence Committee would turn to more specific 
proposals for a ‘NATO nuclear force’, with General Raffaele Cadorna, a Christian 
Democrat from  Italy, presenting his report under this title in December 1960.
34 A 
nuclear force for NATO was a topical subject in December 1960, and the committee 
had decided that the time was ripe to put forward general proposals because the idea 
had been gaining ground amongst some sections of the public. The discussion had 
started earlier that year with the publication of a report by Robert Bowie, submitted on 
behalf of the US Department of State, comprising a proposal for a multilateral force.
35 
At  the  meeting  of  the  WEU  Assembly  in  December,  General  Lauris  Norstad,  the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, delivered an address on the problem of nuclear 
weapons. Only a few weeks before he had made a proposal to establish a NATO 
nuclear force and later that month US Secretary of State Christian Herter would also   11   
present a plan for an allied intermediate range nuclear force to the North Atlantic 
Council.
36 
The  report  of  the  Defence  Committee  of  the  WEU  Assembly  and  the 
subsequent  recommendation  started  to  express  anxiety  concerning  how  the 
proliferation of atomic weapons could be avoided once a suggestion had been made to 
establish a defensive nuclear force within NATO. Such a force would allow SACEUR 
to ensure the direct defence of Europe in the event of a serious attack. To that end, it 
was argued that NATO should agree on a procedure by which every country would 
share control of the nuclear weapons on an equal footing.
37 In these documents the 
committee unequivocally expressed a preference for the NATO framework, an issue 
that had raised many questions and which had been left unresolved in the previous 
year. As NATO had always been the most important defence organization, and the 
only one in which the US participated, this support for NATO was wise – being both 
necessary  and  inevitable.  Nevertheless,  this  reserved  attitude  would  sidetrack  the 
Western European Union in the discussion about a European nuclear force for some 
years.  
Within the North Atlantic alliance there was also no immediate follow-up to 
the American proposal to the North Atlantic Council in December. The new Kennedy 
administration took its time to study the issue at hand and made no attempts to come 
forward  with  a  proposal.  Obviously  they  attributed  no  priority  to  the  plan  for  a 
multilateral  force.  It  is probable  that  they  did  not  abandon  the  project  completely 
because they hoped French and British nuclear forces could somehow be included in 
the force. In Europe, and in Germany in particular, there was an increasing fear that 
US commitment to European defence would diminish.
38  
  By 1962 many politicians in Europe became disappointed that there was no 
follow-up on earlier initiatives for an allied nuclear force, and thus at the end of the 
year the topic of a European nuclear force was once more discussed by the WEU 
Assembly. The report by Anthony Duynstee, a member of the Dutch Catholic party, 
summed  up  the  problem  of  a  European  nuclear  force  and  speaks  open  of  the 
differences of opinion among the members of the committee. Some members of the 
Defence Committee considered the establishment of a European nuclear force to be a 
logical  corollary  to  the  creation  of  a  European  political  union.  They  preferred  a 
nuclear force that should come into being around existing French and British nuclear 
resources. Others opposed such a force on purely political grounds. The rapporteur   12   
mentioned no names of the opponents and accentuated that the majority believed a 
nuclear force was required for the alliance as a whole. The recommendation called 
upon the member governments to make proposals to the North Atlantic Council ‘for a 
NATO nuclear executive to be the sole authority deciding on the deployment and use 
of nuclear weapons’, while also recommending the commencement of negotiations 
with a view to making a proposal to the US ‘to secure the integration of allied nuclear 
forces  into  a  single  NATO  nuclear  force,  possibly  based  on  a  European  and  an 
American component, within a single command structure coming under the control of 
a single political executive representative of the alliance as a whole’.
39 This was a 
very ambitious plan and it should come as no surprise that the recommendation was 
only adopted on the basis of 41 votes for, with 12 abstentions. Ten members of the 
Socialist group withheld their vote, including all German and British representatives, 
and so did the two members of the German Liberal party.
40 The Council also did not 
comply with the wish of the Assembly  and confined themselves to informing the 
Assembly that the recommendation had not been brought up for discussion in the 
North Atlantic Council. 
Despite this lack of political success the Defence Committee continued their 
work and a year later submitted a report calling for a NATO political executive ‘to be 
the sole authority on the use of nuclear weapons by forces assigned to NATO’.
41 The 
report also welcomed the mixed-manning trials on a US warship scheduled to take 
place  the  next  year.
42 It  was  seen  as  the  nucleus  around  which  integrated  NATO 
forces could be built up in the future. For many parliamentarians, however, this was 
pushing things too far and the proposal was hotly debated in the plenary session of the 
Assembly. The political excitement was understandable because international talks on 
a multilateral force actually took place at the same time.
43 In the spring of 1963, the 
United States had come up with a new proposal for a multilateral force. The plan 
called for the creation of a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels equipped with a total of 
200 Polaris missiles. The Polaris A-3 was a medium-range ballistic missile with a 
range  of  2,500  miles,  armed  with  a  one  megaton  nuclear  warhead.  Management, 
control and financing of the fleet would be the joint responsibility of participating 
countries. Joint manning was another essential element in the proposals. Each ship 
would be manned by a crew consisting of at least three nationalities. Although eight 
European countries had entered into talks about the plan and also agreed to participate 
in a trial, by the end of 1963 there had been no substantial discussions on the MLF  in   13   
the national parliaments and many countries had only reluctantly agreed to participate 
in  the  international  talks.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  therefore  that  the 
parliamentarians seized the opportunity with both hands to state their opinion in the 
WEU Assembly and there was much diversity of opinion among them. In the end the 
Assembly  refused  to  adopt  the  draft  resolution  and  voted  in  favour  of  a  revised 
statement proposed by George Brown, a Labour member of the British parliament. 
The text, as amended by the Assembly, called for a unified planning system aimed at 
the  development  of  a  common  strategy  rather  than  a  political  executive.  Every 
reference to the mixed-manning proposal was omitted.
44 The resolution was adopted 
on 4 December 1963  with 43 votes in favour and 23 votes against, while 4 members 
abstained. The arguments of the opponents differed greatly. Some parliamentarians, in 
particular the French Gaullists, supported a national deterrent, others were satisfied 
with the European reliance on the American nuclear guarantee, while some like the 
Italian  Christian  Democrat  Onofrio  Jannuzzi  argued  the  resolution  did  no  go  far 
enough to support the MLF. Subsequently nearly all Italian delegates voted against 
the  resolution  or  withheld  their  votes.  For  the  Italians  national  affiliation  took 
predominance  over  party  discipline  here,  but  this  was  an  exception  to  the  rule. 
Although party discipline in the Assembly was not very strict, the majority of the 
representatives  followed  the  party  line.  Voting  behaviour  on  the  resolutions  on 
defence matters in the WEU Assembly is thus best explained by the party affiliations 
A year later the Assembly adopted the idea of a multilateral nuclear force in 
principle, provided certain conditions were met. As the wider dissemination of nuclear 
weapons  had  to  be  prevented,  the  force  was  not  to  contribute  to  proliferation. 
Furthermore, the participating countries needed to exercise strong political control. In 
the Defence Committee all but three members agreed that a multilateral force should 
be jointly owned, operated and controlled. In his report rapporteur Anthony Duynstee 
gave  his  personal  analysis  of  the  various  voting  arrangements  for  such  a  force  . 
Initially it was only reasonable that the US retained a right to veto, he argued, but 
ultimately any decision to fire should not be obstructed by a veto of the US or any 
other country. Apart from strong political control by the participating countries, the 
recommendation also added that the statute of the force should be the prevention of 
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
45 The recommendation of 1965 added yet 
another provision and demanded that the effect of a joint allied nuclear force upon 
European integration should also be taken into consideration.
46 Thereafter the topic of   14   
an allied nuclear force was no longer of topical interest as the international talks on 
the MLF had died a gentle death.
47 Apart from Germany there had never been great 
enthusiasm among European governments for the plan and at the end of 1964 the 
American administration had made it clear they did not want to push the multilateral 
fleet on their European allies.
48 After the MLF was no longer a political issue the 
recommendations of the WEU Assembly did no longer comprise any  references to an 
allied nuclear force, even if the reports continued to discuss and analyse the concept.
49  
 
The North Atlantic Council as the addressee 
From 1960 there is a gradual change in the wording of the recommendations on the 
state of European security; a change that tells its own story. The structure of the texts 
remains basically the same. All of them start off with the considerations, followed by 
numbered recommendations. The text then reads: ‘The Assembly … recommends that 
the Council …’, with the addressee always being the WEU Council. However, over 
the years there was  a noticeable shift in the way the Council is addressed, with the 
difference mainly lying in the verbs used. Until 1959 the Assembly recommends the 
Council ‘to assure’, ‘to accept’, ‘to inform’ or ‘to take the appropriate steps’. The 
wording makes it clear that the WEU Council should act on its own behalf. In 1960 a 
different expression is employed, with the Council being asked ‘to communicate the 
proposals of the Assembly to the North Atlantic Council’.  
This tendency continued, with NATO playing an increasingly important role, 
sometimes being mentioned in the same breath as the WEU Council; for example, 
when the Assembly ‘urges all member governments of WEU and NATO to take the 
initiative’ (1964). Several times the Assembly uses stronger words and recommends 
that the Council ‘should make the following proposals to the North Atlantic Council’ 
(1965), ‘transmit the following proposals to the North Atlantic Council’ (1968), or 
‘should urge the following course of action on the North Atlantic Council’ (1969). In 
the  wording  of  these  texts  the  Council  is  no  more  than  a  conduit,  with  the  real 
addressee being the North Atlantic alliance.  
The change in wording is accompanied by a focus on the political problems 
that troubled the alliance in this period, first and foremost of course the withdrawal of 
France from the military organization. New developments within the alliance were 
also closely scrutinized. This holds true for the nuclear planning group (1968) and the 
development  of  a  European  caucus  in  the  alliance  (1969),  later  known  under  its   15   
official name Eurogroup (1971). Simultaneously, the Defence Committee remained 
firm on other issues such as the need for standardization of armaments. They also 
repeatedly voiced their demand for a greater say in the alliance for the European allies 
and the need to improve political consultation. To ensure a greater contribution of 
European countries to the North Atlantic alliance, the Defence Committee came up 
with  more  specific  proposals.  In  1965  they  recommended  the  establishment  of  a 
Supreme Executive to be held responsible for the overall direction of the alliance. 
Two  years  later  they  proposed  nominating  a  European  candidate  for  the  post  of 
SACEUR ‘when the appropriate conditions have been achieved in Europe and the 
Alliance’,
50 and in 1972 they recommended that WEU set up a consultative committee 
of chiefs-of-staff within the framework of the alliance.
51 Nuclear weapons and allied 
military  strategy  figure  prominently  among  the  recommendations,  with  the  1968 
report being dedicated to the use of tactical weapons and the defence  of Western 
Europe.  The  recommendation  deals  with  the  political  role  of  the  weapons,  the 
guidelines for their use and puts emphasis on the importance of communications.
52  
  In addition to the more general reports on the state of European security, the 
committee  or  one  of  its  members  continued  to  undertake  technical  studies.  These 
reports deal, for example, with a joint anti-submarine force or compare the conditions 
of service in the armed services of various European countries. The most striking 
feature,  however,  is  the  increase  in  the  number  of  reports  on  political  aspects  of 
European defence. In the ten years between 1965 and 1975, the Defence committee 
published reports on the political organization of European defence,
53 the relationship 
with the United States
54 and the impact of global developments in East-West relations 
or arms control on the defence of Europe
55 – all in all there were ten reports. Here the 
committee lives up to expectations and consistently investigates these matters from a 
European  perspective.  Invariably,  the  Assembly,  on  the  advice  of  its  Defence 
Committee,  then  recommends  actions  to  encourage  European  countries  to  seek 
agreement and to safeguard common interests.  
The  non-proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  is  a  good  case  in  point.  The 
Assembly put pressure on the Council to seek a joint position on this subject in 1967 
and issued a report two years later. There they urged the individual governments to 
sign the non-proliferation treaty, meanwhile claiming the right of a future European 
federation  to  possess  nuclear  weapons.
56 Within  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  the 
interests of the European member states were also to be taken into account. Therefore,   16   
European countries were to play an active role in allied planning committees such as 
the Nuclear Planning Group, to exercise influence on contingency planning for the 
possible use of nuclear weapons.
57 The Assembly also welcomed cooperation among 
the  member  countries  in  the  framework  of  European  Political  Cooperation,  in 
particular  their  efforts  to  bring  to  life  the  talks  on  Mutual  and  Balanced  Force 
Reductions and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
 
The adoption of recommendations by national parliaments 
The WEU parliamentarians always contended that their Assembly constituted the only 
forum  for  interparliamentary  debate  on  European  defence  issues  and  the  ideal 
framework for encouraging greater cooperation. The sessions of the Assembly, held 
twice  a  year,  offered  an  opportunity  for  the  members  from  all  seven  European 
countries to enter into a debate and send political signals to their national governments. 
However,  in  the  plenary  meetings  of  the  WEU  Assembly  the  number  of 
parliamentarians actively involved in the debate was usually limited. Most speakers 
addressed  the  meeting  on  behalf  of  their  political  friends  because  the  different 
political groups met regularly during the sessions to discuss the draft resolutions and 
provide comments on the reports. As a consultative organization the WEU Assembly 
had only limited means to influence policy at the national level and none of their 
decisions were binding. The recommendations were addressed to the WEU Council 
and were brought to the attention of the national parliaments as well.  
From the beginning the Assembly tried to obtain information on the follow-up 
of their recommendations. The direct impact of a report or a recommendation was 
often difficult to measure. As early as May 1957 a working party which would liaise 
with national parliaments was established. It selected which recommendations would 
be  sent  to  the  national  parliaments  and  tried  to  maintain  its  influence  over  any 
subsequent actions, the committee submitting biannual reports to that end. The main 
motive  was  to  see  whether  the  parliaments  took  steps  to  encourage  their  own 
government to accept the recommendations adopted by the Assembly. However, as 
the  rapporteur  observed  in  June  1959:  ‘The  achievements  are  still  negligible’.
58 
Thereupon,  the  working  party  decided  not  only  to  send  the  text  of  the 
recommendations, but to add written draft questions for the parliamentarians in their 
own languages and to request every member of the Assembly to take action in their   17   
national parliaments. As of 1962 a brief report about each parliamentary session was 
made to act as a basis for reports of activities for individual members.
59  
The activities of the working party itself were twofold. Apart from sending 
information to the national parliaments the committee also kept track of the responses 
of the national parliaments, initially as part of the report. From June 1963 onwards the 
information was published in a separate booklet, and from June 1964 in a monthly 
Bulletin on European Parliamentary Activity. The working party urged all members 
to take action in their own parliaments. Usually, written questions were put to the 
ministers,  sometimes  followed  by  oral  questions.  On  other  occasions,  issues  were 
raised in the context of discussions about foreign affairs or defence budgets, with the 
number of these interventions steadily growing. Matters concerning the WEU were 
discussed mainly in parliamentary committees, as it was far more difficult to arrange a 
debate  in  a  plenary  session  of  the  German  Bundestag  or  the  British  House  of 
Commons  on  WEU  recommendations.
60 Only  in  April  1968  did  the  rapporteur 
observe  that  the  response  in  the  national  parliaments  ‘can  be  considered 
satisfactory’.
61 It was abundantly clear this was an exception to the rule because the 
increase in engagements was caused by the motion to disagree with the annual report 
of the ministerial Council in the preceding year. The report of March 1969 once again 
expresses  the  by  then  well-known  grievances  about  a  lack  of  attention  to  the 
recommendations of the Assembly. A similar image emerges from an overview from 
1975,  included  in  the  report  on  relations  with  parliaments.  In  the  beginning,  the 
number of actions was limited to 10–12, in early 1960 this increased from 40 to 98 in 
two successive years, and it reached an all-time high of 126 in 1968. Thereafter it fell 
to 48 and further to 10 in 1972.
62  
Although  the  working  party  thereupon  decided  to  pay  visits  to  various 
countries and tried to initiate more contact with members of national parliaments who 
were not part of the WEU Assembly, the complaints persisted. The Assembly itself 
had  little  power  and  to  the  disappointment  of  the  WEU  representatives  their 
documents  were  not  used  by  their  fellow  parliamentarians  to  put  pressure  on  the 
national governments. This reduced the chances that these recommendations would be 
followed, as it decreased the possibility of breaking down the reluctance and hesitancy 
of the WEU Council by way of pressure from members’ own parliaments. There was 
a  huge  gap  between  the  national  parliaments  and  the  few  defence  specialists 
represented in the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly, and the direct impact   18   
of their reports on national decision-making remained marginal at best. The reports 
rather acted as sources of information and called attention to problems in the field of 
defence. In this sense the resolutions of the WEU Assembly did add weight to the 
national debate on defence issues.
63 As the resolutions unceasingly encouraged the 
member states to look for common ground, the question is whether these activities 
contributed to the development of a common orientation on European defence. 
 
A European defence identity? 
In 1975 the Defence Committee submitted a comprehensive report on the state of 
European security to mark the twentieth anniversary of the WEU Assembly. In the 
chapter on the future organization of European defence the rapporteur Karl Heinrich 
Lemmrich, a member of the German Christlich Soziale Union, concluded that ‘the 
creation  of  a  European  defence  identity  is  a  worthwhile  aim.  It  increases  the 
importance  of  Europe’s  contribution  to  western  defence  and  should  be  a  decisive 
improvement,  but  much  ground  still  has  to  be  covered’.
64 At  the  commemorative 
sitting  in  Bonn  a  month  later,  the  then  president  of  the  Assembly,  the  French 
representative Edmond Nessler, argued that a European identity implied the will to 
power, but in his view Europe still seemed to be a large body in search of a soul. 
‘Western  European  Union  could  have  provided  the  framework  within  which  to 
organize the structure of European security in a rational manner’, he continued, but 
‘fair words are not enough. … It is the Assembly’s duty to give our governments a 
solemn warning and to voice the concern of the public at their ditherings. For our 
appeal to be heard, we must eschew theoretical debate and political theology and try 
to adopt practical goals which exactly fit the requirements of the situation’.
65  
  Nessler  hit  the  mark  here  and  his  comments  are  appropriate.  The 
parliamentarians had first-hand knowledge and knew all too well that their influence 
did  not  extend  very  far;  they  did  not  deceive  themselves  about  their  authority. 
Whenever  they  brought  up  the  European  defence  identity  for  discussion,  they 
invariably pointed to the fact that this could only be the consequence of a common 
European  foreign  policy:  ‘the  last  stone  to  crown  the  politically-united  European 
edifice’.
66 Of course this argument was valid, but it could not conceal the fact that the 
parliamentarians  themselves  were  divided  on  the  issue  of  European  security.  This 
holds true for the idea of an allied nuclear force in 1959 as much as for discussions on 
a European pillar of NATO or a European defence identity. This comes to the fore   19   
when we study the three reports on Euro-Atlantic relations and the three reports on the 
future organization of European defence as well as the recommendations that rest on 
these reports.
67 In the General Affairs Committee, which submitted the first of these 
reports  in  June  1967,  objections  were  raised  when  the  rapporteur  referred  to  the 
possibility of a European nuclear weapon in the future. The rapporteur, Hans-Joachim 
von  Merkatz,  a  Christian  Democrat  and  member  of  the  German  Bundestag, 
nevertheless kept to his opinion that ‘provision had to be made for a future united 
Europe  to  be  master  of  its  destiny’,  and  warned  that  membership  of  the  Atlantic 
alliance should not jeopardize European cohesion.
68 As his opinion was not shared by 
the majority of his committee the draft recommendation did not contain a single word 
about a European nuclear weapon.  
Draft  recommendations  presented  by  the  committee  were  political 
compromises  of  course.  During  the  subsequent  plenary  discussions  these  draft 
documents were often heavily criticized by other parliamentarians and only agreed 
upon by the Assembly after amendment. The reports on European security for 1957 
and  1959,  as  mentioned  above,  are  good  examples  of  this.  Even  when  amended, 
several  of  the  recommendations  with  regard  to  nuclear  weapons  for  Europe  were 
adopted with a number of votes against, or quite a few abstentions.
69 When all was 
said and done, party political views were decisive at the voting. 
  Taking  into  consideration  the  arguments  above,  Ernst  C.  Lotter,  a  German 
political  researcher  who  looks  upon  the  Western  European  Union  Assembly  as 
marking the onset of a European defence identity, tends to exaggerate.
70The Assembly 
stepped into the breach for the sake of European interests whenever they thought it 
was  expedient.  They  took  a  firm  line  in  this,  in  particular  with  regard  to  nuclear 
strategy. They argued repeatedly for flexibility as well as for the need to increase the 
numbers of conventional forces. The Assembly was not a sanctuary for discussion 
without restraint, it was an interparliamentary and a political body, with its members 
attempting  to  establish  a  dialogue  with  the  government  on  all  matters  concerning 
defence. They regarded it as their duty to point to the ‘constitutional flaw’ in NATO 
with respect to the control of nuclear weapons, as much as it was their duty to put 
pressure on the British government to maintain its forces in Europe or to emphasize 
the need for adequate defence expenditure. It did not necessarily follow that Europe 
needed a defence identity of its own, or that the Western European Union should 
develop into a European pillar of NATO.   20   
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